10 Gründe gegen eine Opfer-Ideologie

In einem interessanten Artikel werden 10 Gründe genannt, warum eine Opferhaltung eine Seuche der Menschheit ist:

There are plenty of problems that arise in corollary to adopting a victimhood culture as a moral paradigm. Here, I’ll introduce and describe ten of the more significant and alarming issues that directly follow from adopting a victimhood culture.

1. Moral Dependence

Moral dependence means becoming psychologically dependent upon outsourcing one’s capacity to reach resolutions to moral and social conflicts to external agents and authorities. It is one of the biggest problems associated with reliance upon a culture of victimhood, and it is one of the strongest identifiers that suggest a connection between victimhood culture and emotional/moral immaturity.

„Die Männer waren es“ oder „wegen der bösen Strukturen ist eh alles hoffnungslos, wir werden immer benachteiligt und Männer haben alle Privilegien“ wären Beispiele dafür. Man hat seine Erklärung für alles, was einem passiert und muss nicht mehr nach eigenen Fehlern oder Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten suchen. Solche zu finden wird sogar noch erschwert, denn es wird als Angriff auf die „reale Weltsicht“ gesehen.

Andere Kandidaten sind „die feministisch verseuchte Justiz“ die „korrupten Richter“ und natürlich auch „die Ausländer“

Honor cultures rely least upon the outsourcing of resolving moral and social conflicts, and thus they also present with the highest level of violence as a means to remedy social conflict. Dignity cultures aim to appeal to external authorities and agents for conflict resolution only at need, recognizing that such entities (like those imbued with political authority, e.g. courts) offer a good third-party solution to conflicts large enough to be difficult to resolve otherwise or to ignore. Victimhood cultures, using the natural moral currency of victimhood as a means, seek external avenues to social conflict resolution as a primary tool. These may be governments, non-governmental institutional authorities (like university administrations or other non-state governmental bodies), and motivated groups of partisan actors who enact social pressure, penalty, or retribution for perceived wrongdoing as a means of conflict resolution and social deterrence.

Some examples of victimhood culture in action in these regards are almost everything to do with modern activism culture: protest rallies, leaflet campaigns, publicizing offenses on websites, call-out culture, open letters, gratuitous petitions, and so on, and they are characteristic of victimhood culture when they are centrally concerned with rallying sufficient partisan support, via a vector of responding to perceived victimhood, to convince authorities or mobs to act.

The primary problems with moral dependence are that it weakens the individual’s capacity to seek and find conflict resolution and it undermines the capacity of a social contract to enforce resolutions to the kinds of social conflicts they’re best suited to resolve. The way in which the second of these problems arises is hard to describe as anything but childish and awful.

Man erinnere sich an die „Safe Spaces“ mit Videos von Hundewelpen oder das Gekreische und die vollkommene Unfähigkeit andere Meinung zu ertragen, Zusammenbrüche, weil einen Kleinigkeiten triggern und die Übertreibung von so ziemlich allem als Angriff.

It happens when courts come to a conclusion that the prevailing victimhood culture disagrees with and its actors proceed to seek another means for resolution anyway. In other words, such actors are not holding up their end of the bargain in a social contract that utilizes courts to resolve certain kinds of social conflicts and thus undermine its utility. (Courts are effective because we take their rulings to be binding, and their effectiveness is undermined when their adjudications are considered instead as calls merely to find another way to achieve a perception of justice.)

The secondary problem with moral dependence is more insidious. According to an email conversation I had with developmental psychologist Jeff Arnett, who is the originator of the developmental phase called „emerging adulthood,“ usually ages 18-25, one of the specific developmental challenges associated with that final phase before full adulthood is learning moral independence. Practicing moral dependence and entrenching that pattern in the mind during that last crucial phase of neurobiological development is a significant problem because it cripples emerging adults in their future capacity to seek mature conflict resolution. (During emerging adulthood, the brain is undergoing changes that strengthen neuronal pathways that are heavily used and removing ones that are less used, setting heavy reinforcement to the cognitive architecture upon which adult cognition will be based.)

Man lernt also nicht, sich von den Wertungen anderer unabhängiger zu machen (und selbst zu denken) und einen Konflikt auf erwachsene Weise zu lösen.

Die Verwendung von Begriffen wie „sexistische Kackscheiße“ wäre vielleicht ein gutes Beispiel, wie kindisch das häufig ist.

2. Victim and Trauma Centrality

In the Journal of Traumatic Stress, in 2011, Donald Robinaugh and Richard McNally published a paper titled „Trauma Centrality and PTSD Symptom Severity“ that indicated that trauma centrality (to be defined momentarily) increases severity and duration of PTSD symptoms, which may generalize to other types of stress-related disorders as well. Trauma centrality refers to importing the relevant (psychological) trauma into one’s identity, defining the self in terms of the trauma suffered. I’m using the term „victim centrality“ to refer to the same general idea: taking the notion of victimhood as an integral part of one’s working identity. In short, believing yourself intrinsically to be a victim makes you more of one, speaking psychologically.

Das „Opfer sein“ als zentrales Element der eigenen Identität wird gerade gut im intersektionalen Feminismus deutlich: Irgendwie kann da jeder Opfer sein, nicht nur weil er eine Frau ist, sondern in einer Vielzahl anderer Kategorien, die in in der Kombination zu einem noch größeren Opfer machen und über Deutungshoheit und andere Regelungen sogar zum alleinigen Herrscher über das Opfersein.

Der Opferbegriff steht im Feminismus an einer ganz zentralen Stelle: Die Einordnung in Privilegierte und Unterdrückte wird binär in der jeweiligen Kategorie vorgenommen: Man kann innerhalb dieser nur eines von beiden Sein und darzulegen auf welche Art man Opfer ist, ist wichtigster Teil der eigenen Identität

Victimhood culture is effectively synonymous with victim centrality, and very often with trauma centrality. (Cf. Tumblr, pretty much all of it.) The reason is not difficult to guess: the natural currency of victimhood provides social support, thus social reinforcement and value, to victims of trauma. Identifying oneself as a victim taps into the exploitation at the center of victimhood culture. The result is that people seeking that reward, perhaps a significant portion of a generation right now, are importing into their sense of personal identity anything that can reinforce their perception of victimhood status and thus enhancing their own victim/trauma centrality. The result, of course, according to Robinaugh and McNally, is that this specific behavior worsens the very symptoms at the heart of the mentality, and so a vicious circle of mental illness is easily established around engagement in a victimhood culture.

Ein netter Teufelskreis: Als Opfer hat man Anspruch darauf, dass man unterstützt wird, was einen noch mehr darin bestärkt, dass man Opfer sein sollte und was einem eine Motivation gibt, Opferpositionen auszumachen, die man einnehmen kann.

In case you have ever wondered why it seems like a lot of Millennials are almost willfully proud of having various self-diagnosed (paging Dr. Wikipedia) and exaggerated mental illnesses, apparently driving themselves legitimately into neuroses in the process, here you go. They derive reinforcing social benefit from doing so in axes defined uniquely by victimhood culture. These features are completely absent in dignity culture, where wallowing in mental illness is not as dignified as getting treatment and recovering, and are abhorred in honor culture, where such a thing is so dishonorable as to, perhaps, provoke socially condoned suicides (Cf. historical Japanese culture).

Ebenfalls gut zu erkennen daran, wie tief sich einige dort hineinsteigern und wie sie die Welt kaum noch ertragen können.

3. Grievance Jockeying (Competitive Victimhood)

Psychologist David Ley outlined the feature of victimhood culture known as „competitive victimhood,“ which has been called (by Gad Saad) „The Oppression Olympics.“ I prefer the term „grievance jockeying.“ These terms explain the phenomenon pretty clearly: groups and individuals compete for the limited resource of human compassion extended to victims–the natural moral currency of victimhood–by attempting to paint themselves or their charges as bigger victims than other people. That is, victimhood culture is self-accelerating, with all of its attendant problems.

Das ist das an anderer Stelle bereits angesprochene „Race to the bottom„. „Alles ist sexistisch und man muss auf jede Form des Sexismus hinweisen“ wäre ein Beispiel, wie immer neue Beeinträchtigungen gefunden werden können und wie alles immer sensibler wird, es finden sich aber auch zu jedem Thema irgendwie ein Anhänger der Opfer-Olympiade, der es zu einer Beinträchtigung umdeuten kann.

One offshoot of grievance jockeying noted by Manning and Campbell is that the dignified majority will gradually diminish as ever more groups within it find ways to identify themselves as victims and compete for the limited (thus increasingly valuable) moral currency afforded by victim status under a victimhood culture. That is, people who do not normally view themselves as victims will begin to peel themselves off from the dominant dignity culture specifically in order to see themselves as victims for the benefits victimhood cultures provide. All they need to do is find an identity group to which they can claim to belong and discover a way in which it is beleaguered, and they’re off to the races. Victimhood culture begets more subcultures that claim victimhood status. That is, victimhood culture is virulent.

Das ist einer der Punkt, die erklären, warum Intersektionalität so populär ist: Es bietet Opferpositionen für jeden. Die weiße Frau kann zusätzlich noch dick sein, was ihr Weißsein zumindest etwas aufbessert.

For what it’s worth, under epidemological thought (which studies how diseases spread), a damaging, self-accelerating, highly virulent infectious agent is labeled a „plague,“ so it’s really not too much of a stretch to brand victimhood culture a moral plague upon mankind.

Hat was.

4. Hyper-*: Hypersensitivity, Hypervigilence, Catastrophizing

Under the influences listed above, particularly grievance jockeying combined with victim centrality, we can also expect to see an increase in some „hypers,“ and we do. Hypersensitivity to slights is another infectious trait of victimhood culture because, under such a moral culture, it is an easy way to create a persuasive case for victimhood status. (Manning and Campbell titled their paper „Microaggressions and Moral Cultures“ for a reason.) Hypervigilence to perceived defection from excessive moral norms is also both predictable and already occurring. (Here’s your „thought police“ and „outrage merchants,“ especially on social media, folks.)

Übertreibungen und das Ausrufen von Kleinigkeiten zu einem großen Problem entstehen in der Tat schnell, wenn man seine ganze Identität auf seinem Opferstatus aufbaut und gleichzeitig mit anderen darum wetteifern muss, wer mehr Opfer ist.

Catastrophizing is slightly separate, predictable, and occurring. Catastrophizing is the habit of making emotional mountains out of molehills, taking slights or small disruptions as outright catastrophes. When you see a pitiful video of a college-aged student having a complete meltdown and throwing trashcans over an intentionally provocative and offensive show being given by a personality like Milo Yiannopolous, as happened at UCLA recently, you are seeing catastrophizing in action. It’s as easy to see how catastrophizing is related to all of the above features of victimhood culture as it is to find examples of it occurring on a regular basis as victimhood cultures increase in visibility and social allure.

„Katastrophieren“ klingt nach etwas, was ich in Zukunft häufiger verwenden werde, einfach weil es so ungemein häufig vorkommt.

5. Sociopolitical Balkanization

Balkanization refers to splitting off into distinct, nonoverlapping groups that used to interact but don’t anymore, and it is not healthy within a modern democracy. Sociopolitical balkanization refers specifically to drawing such deep moral lines that, say, conservatives and liberals refuse even to talk to each other, much less work together. You can think of it like an extreme form of the denominalization process in churches with the added feature that members of rival moral sects cannot typically find common ground with other groups, except it’s happening across the entire society.

Darunter fallen dann wohl zum einen die Selbstzerfleischungen im Feminismus, insbesondere wenn jemand ein Opferidentität nicht hinreichend anerkannt hat oder eine andere Auffassung zu deren Wichtigkeit vertritt. Aber auch die Einteilung in starre Gruppen, die von den anderen unterdrückt werden.

Die Bildung von Safe Spaces für diese Gruppen, etwa die Auffassung, dass Männer allenfalls „Allys“ sein können und den Mund zu halten haben oder das Weiße sich nicht in „PoC-Safe Spaces“ einbringen sollen oder das allgemein „die Guten“ auf der einen Seite und „die Bösen“ (das Pack, die deplorables, die „Nazis“) auf der anderen Seite sind und man sich abgrenzt und es geradezu unerträglich findet, wenn etwas von der anderen Gruppe in den eigenen Bereich dringt, wären Beispiele dafür.

Sociopolitical balkanization reduces conversation and compromise between varying factions within a society or state, and it increases absolutism (partly via the social identity effect of „we’re good; they’re bad, with ‚they‘ meaning ’not us.'“). It grinds the democratic process to a halt, increases general political cynicism that pulls everyone down, and makes the entire social and political mood more dour and hateful.

Das „Absolutistische“ und die fehlende Bereitschaft zu argumentieren sind in dieser Hinsicht in der Tat ein sehr häufig anzutreffendes Phänomen.

It’s the opposite of what we should want if we seek to pursue happiness and create a functioning society, but under victimhood cultures, you might notice that it is eagerly embraced (block people who disagree with you from your newsfeed because „nobody has time for that kind of negativity,“ anybody?). You’ll immediately notice that balkanization of this kind also creates and reinforces echo chambers inside of which the ideologically committed can further divorce their views from reality without immediate consequences.

Sociopolitical balkanization arises as victimhood occupies more space as a moral culture, where victimhood status can be obtained over moral offenses, including insults and slights, instead of for more obvious types of injury. It will be intensified by grievance jockeying, as competing identity groups attempt to prove themselves more worthy of their share of the natural moral currency of victimhood status. More on this in the next point.

Der Effekt ist momentan in der Tat sehr gut zu beobachten.

6. Inflation upon the Natural Moral Currency of Victimhood

The natural moral currency of victimhood is a thing, a real thing, and probably not one we want to lose. It is, properly understood, the correct balance of human compassion that enables human societies to thrive and grow (especially if we want them filled with happy, well-adjusted individuals). We care when people are being cheated or hurt, and we should care because it’s part of what defines our humanity, and our societies simply work better for all involved when we manage those kinds of problems as well as we can.

Victimhood cultures demand that more and more „victims“ have access to the fruits of this natural moral currency, which in turn demands more output of this currency from participants or caring social compatriots (which means most of you and people like me who happen to live alongside these people and haven’t become fully jaded or coldly self-interested yet). Quick Macroeconomics 101 question: What happens when you increase the total amount of a currency in circulation without increasing the real value of the goods and services it can purchase? Inflation!

Under a victimhood culture, the demands put on the natural moral currency of victimhood devalue that currency. You’ve maybe heard the symptoms of this problem put with all the eloquence of the Millennial muse, Apathy: „Have you seen my fucks field? It is barren. I have no fucks left to give.“ Why is that? One part of it is that the natural moral currency that we extend to people who are struggling is only worth a fraction of what it used to be, and that dries people up, burns them out, jades them, and eventually causes people to drop out of the game (either by becoming moochers on the system or by becoming curmudgeons who refuse to support the system itself). (Yes, I know that another part of it is that there’s a legitimate problem by which the efforts of many people aren’t returning the promised rewards, and society is largely tipped toward entrenched opportunity, that is „gildedness,“ and that contributes to the power of Apathy’s song too. No need to mention it.)

I hope we can agree that this isn’t something we want happening. The reverse, and the cure, is what people under a dignity culture would call „personal responsibility.“ (Did you ever think you’d hear a left of left-of-center liberal say that? Well, here we are! Don’t worry, though, I still think much of this problem is remedied also by our social contract bending itself toward greater opportunities near the bottom, like a good lefty, but certainly more ownership of personal responsibility is needed by anyone who has subscribed to a culture of victimhood, for their own good and for everyone else’s.)

Also: Wenn sehr viele Leute eine Opferkultur einnehmen, dann wird keiner mehr tatsächlich als Opfer angesehen und enthält dafür auch kein Mitleid. Die Leute stumpfen ab, wenn jeder ein Opfer ist. Weswegen man die Schraube immer weiter drehen muss, damit man noch als Opfer wahrgenommen werden kann. Man muss übertreiben, laut Positionen einfodern, man muss sich noch mehr als Opfer darstellen, als man ohnehin schon ist. Schon sind Organisationen wie „Black life matters“ geboren, die ein durchaus legitimes Ziel wie einen Kampf gegen Rassismus zu etwas machen, bei dem sie Weiße hassen um die Unterdrückung als besonders schlimm darzustellen und unsinnige Forderung aufstellen, um deutlich zu machen, wie sehr sie Opfer sind.

7. Mental Health Concerns: Anxiety, Depression, and Paranoia

Mostly because of the effects of victim centrality, moral dependence, an inflated moral currency of victimhood, and grievance jockeying, victimhood cultures come paired with an increase in some of the very problems they claim to hope to remedy, mental health issues like anxiety, depression, and paranoia. You’ll have noticed that these are all way up in Millennials, I’m sure, and while some of that increase must be accounted for directly because they’re being financially screwed and have diminished options ahead of them, some of it comes directly from having learned to outsource their social conflict problems via a culture of victimhood instead of owning themselves and their self-esteem via a culture of dignity.

Das im Feminismus besonders viele Leute mit psychologischen Probleme sind und gerade auch Depressionen dort stark verbreitet sind spricht für diese These. Ich hatte dazu schon einmal was zitiert:

Ich weine nicht über tote Kaninchen, ich weine um die Welt. Ich weine über die Situation der vielfältigen Unterdrückten. Über meine Situation. Über den Mehrwert, die Ware, den Zinseszins. Über die Erkenntnis, dass ich nicht mal eine Sprache besitze, die jenseits des kapitalistischen Rahmens klingt. Dass der kapitalistische Rahmen sich mit jedem meiner Schritte , und den Schritten anderer, ein Stück weiter ausdehnt, wie ein Luftballon, den man aufpustet, wie das Universum, in manchen Theorien. Ich weine um meine Unsichtbarkeit, die sich gar nicht so unsichtbar anfühlt, weil ich doch pinke Haare habe und grelle Klamotten und erst kürzliche noch auf einer Bühne stand. Ich weine um meine geringe Handlungsfähigkeit angesichts der Übermacht der *istischen Diskurse. Angesichts der Uhr, die läuft, von 0 bis 12 und von 12 bis 0. (…)

Ich soll Sport machen. Bewegung als das beste Antidepressivum. Die Frage ist : Will man funktionieren, wieso, und macht es das nicht schlimmer? Wenn ich jetzt klein beigebe, weitermache, die Zähne zusammenbeiße. Depression aushalten kommt nahe ran an eine ehrliche Haltung zum Sachverhalt. Konsequenter vielleicht als Lächeln und Winken.

Freund_innen/Verbündete/Andere, die alle das gleicheProblemzu habenscheinen.

Passt meiner Meinung nach ganz gut zu den 10 Punkten.

Compounding the issue is that having a mental illness (maybe so long as one identifies with the right demographics) is a victimhood status in itself, and so victimhood cultures will have a bent toward embracing and exacerbating certain kinds of quasi-functional mental illnesses. Thus victimhood cultures generate a kind of neurotic-chic that proclaims itself largely in hashtags. This effect may sound patently ridiculous, but, again, a half an hour on Tumblr will readily convince you that this kind of thing isn’t just happening, it’s epidemic.

8. Victimhood by Proxy

If you can achieve social status by being a victim, you can also achieve social status by being an „ally“ to a victim, and so victimhood culture reliably evolves a system of victimhood by proxy. (We often refer to these people, at the moment, as „Social Justice Warriors.) These are not people who are necessarily victims themselves but are people who have taken up the charge of victims – whether desired or not – because of the social status it confers to them. They, though not victims themselves, are champions of the beneficiaries of the natural moral currency of victimhood, and thus they, though not victims themselves, collect rent on that moral currency.

Das ist glaube ich in der Tat eine der unheilvollsten Allianzen: Leute mit einer absoluten Opferidentität, die noch verstärkt wird durch „Opfer by proxy“. Weiße Feministinnen sind als Frau Opfer, als Ally sind sie Opfer by proxy. Und über diesen Kampf kann man sich noch einfacher in eine Opferhaltung bringen.

It isn’t at all hard to see how this will go, and because being saddled with the burden of actual victimhood will diminish one’s opportunities, Victhimhood Landlords (sometimes called „White Knights“ or, more broadly and depending on context, „Social Justice Warriors“) will have greater opportunity to craft the nuances of the victimhood narrative. Why are there so many „well educated,“ white, upper-middle-class busybodies serving as the most visible social justice champions? Because they’re Victimhood Landlords, and they’re raking it in — in terms of moral currency (in case you’ve ever heard them insist that they’re not in it for the money because they’re broke, here you go: the currency in play is moral, hence esteem and social status, not monetary).

Because Victimhood Landlords, a.k.a. „good allies,“ have an opportunity to craft the victimhood narrative, it is often a caricature of real vectors of victimhood. Victimhood Landlords also benefit directly from failing to resolve victimhood-related problems and by identifying new classes of victims or reasons they should be outraged, so they have motivations to prove ineffective in their allyship and to become Outrage Merchants on the side. These are problems that have not gone unnoticed.

„Opfer-Verpächter“ wäre ein erster Ansatz für Victimhood Landlords. Sie bieten die Grundlage, innerhalb der andere ihre Opferidentität ausbauen können. Und sie zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie besonders schöne, große Opferidentitäten ermöglichen. Sie können ihre Verbundenheit auch darstellen, in dem sie sich besonders über Mißstände aufregen.

Betroffene, die sich nicht als Opfer fühlen, etwa Frauen, die sich nicht als unterdrückt ansehen, sind dann Leute, die dieses schöne Gebäude kaputt machen und demjenigen die Geschäfte verderben.

9. Chilling Effects (on Spontaneity, Creativity, and Academic Exploration)

Ever heard that advice to „dance like nobody is watching“? There’s a reason for it. You will be least creative and spontaneous when you think you are being watched and judged. Via the mechanisms discussed above, plus the social threats that come with them, victimhood culture creates a chilling culture where people are more afraid to express themselves, to be spontaneous, to be honest, to be creative, to be authentic, to be open, to be friendly, and to be curious, lest they be judged for it (and held accountable to the Thought Police and their online mobs of self-righteously hate-filled partisan actors).

Auch das ist ein häufig gesehener Effekt. Niemand wagt mehr etwas zu sagen, weil er Angst hat anzuecken.

Dazu zB dieser Text:

Der Netzfeminismus ist zu einer sehr zersplitterten Bewegung geworden. Es spaltet sich entlang verschiedener Konflikte. Das eine ist die Frage nach der „Calling Out Culture“ – also wie sehr basiert das Handeln und der Aktivismus darauf, auf andere mit dem Finger zu zeigen und sie bloßzustellen? Wie viel ist echter Dialog ist gewollt? Viele hantieren mit dem Wort „Intersektionalität“ – schreiben aber gleichzeitig Bücher, die voll mit so vielen Unterstrichen sind, dass sie das Gegenteil von leichter Sprache sind und selbst ich für das Lesen von 80 Seiten eine Zugfahrt von 8 Stunden dafür brauchte. Das Problem ist nicht, dass es solche Bücher gibt – das ist an sich sogar ziemlich witzig eigentlich. Das Problem ist, dass die eigenen Definitionen zum Standard erhoben werden sollen. Koste es, was es wolle. So wird unglaublich viel kaputt gemacht.

oder unter Beißreflexe:

Harsche Sprachregulierungen und Kritik nach Innen

Um es klar zu sagen: Hier geht es nicht um Sprechverbote für Faschos

Mir geht es darum, dass die Sprechverbote im queeren Aktivismus das Denken und die Auseinandersetzung verhindern, auch bei Beiträgen, die diskutabel sind. Der queere Aktivismus, den ich kritisiere, wendet sich mit der Autorität vor allem nach innen: Etwa mit harschen Sprachregulierungen. Da wird nicht mehr nach Intention und Inhalt gefragt, sondern danach, ob etwas „problematisch“ sei. Der wichtigste Maßstab ist in diesen Fällen, ob etwas verletzend oder gar „triggernd“ sei – und schon ist die Welt eine hochgefährliche Angelegenheit, vor der man sich in Sicherheit bringen muss. Die Gefahr wird überwertig. Man macht sich handlungsunfähig und fordert nur noch, dass bestimmte Menschen oder Aussagen verbannt werden sollen, damit man bloß keine Irritation ertragen muss. Damit wird auch jedes neugierige Nachfragen, jedes Wundern über die Welt zur Gewalt stilisiert und verhindert

Es lassen sich eine Vielzahl weiterer Beispiele finden, etwa unter dem Stichwort „Call out Culture“

It cannot be an optimal solution to the human problem of culture to stifle spontaneity, honesty, creativity, authenticity, openness, friendliness, curiosity, and academic exploration, especially when the reason these are being stifled is literally an increase in paranoia about being judged negatively for them. In case you wondered where the increase depression and anxiety scores might be coming from, this is very likely to be a part of it. Be yourself? No way. Not worth the punishment if you slip.

There is almost nothing more chilling to a free society — as tyrants around the world have repeatedly demonstrated to horrific success — as feeling watched by your neighbors. The Inquisition used it, the witch hunts used it, the Nazis used it, the Maoists used it, and the dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty-Four was built almost entirely upon the horror of it. Victimhood culture also uses it because it outsources its moral muscle to groups of like-minded partisans (that it sways with victimhood narratives) and to institutional authorities. Victimhood culture is intrinsically chilling to any free society, and it is thus a cancer upon any free society that progresses far enough to evolve one.

Sehr passend.

10. Outsourced Social Control Mechanisms (A Slippery Slope to Totalitarianism)

We’ll end where it gets ugliest, the logical extension of the last paragraph of the previous point. Remember that Manning and Campbell characterized victimhood cultures as tending to report slights (minor social conflicts) in the hopes of attracting partisans or institutional authorities to correct them. They are highly sensitive and tend to seek a solution to their problems by being censorious. They are also punitive, seeking solutions to social conflicts by recruiting some institutionalized authority (university administrations being paradigmatic at the moment, although government can easily get on board too) or partisan mobs. They then petition those authorities (again, by recruiting the will of like-minded partisans) or mobilize those mobs to act to effect their desired resolutions.

If institutional authority doesn’t work, they will work to change the institutional authority, and given enough power, their censorious approach will be institutionalized. We see this happening in university settings already and even in some government settings (although the Constitution, at least in the US, serves as a fairly stalwart defender of many civil liberties here, at least for now).

Not all slopes are slippery, and not all slide to totalitarianism, but this one is and does. Every inch of ground given to victimhood culture, because of its plague-like nature (meaning that technically and thus non-pejoratively), slips us toward a more hypersensitive, more censorious, more punitive society in which those who currently hold the most social power (the biggest victims, or, really, their Victimhood Landlords) determine what is allowable, who and what are to be censored, who deserves censured, and who is to be punished, and in what way, all independent of the kind of social contract that time and experience have proven create a robust culture of self-restraint, non-violence, and legitimate progress.

Sehr gut gesagt und eine sehr reale Gefahr.