Ein Tweet wies auf eine interessante Studie hin:
Aus dem Artikel:
Conspiracy theories (CTs) are widespread ways by which people make sense of unsettling or disturbing cultural events. Belief in CTs is often connected to problematic consequences, such as decreased engagement with conventional political action or even political extremism, so understanding the psychological and social qualities of CT belief is important. CTs have often been understood to be “monological,” displaying the tendency for belief in one conspiracy theory to be correlated with belief in (many) others. Explanations of monologicality invoke a nomothetical or “closed” mindset whereby mutually supporting beliefs based on mistrust of official explanations are used to interpret public events as conspiracies, independent of the facts about those events (which they may ignore or deny). But research on monologicality offers little discussion of the content of monological beliefs and reasoning from the standpoint of the CT believers. This is due in part to the “access problem”: CT believers are averse to being researched because they often distrust researchers and what they appear to represent. Using several strategies to address the access problem we were able to engage CT believers in semi-structured interviews, combining their results with analysis of media documents and field observations to reconstruct a conspiracy worldview – a set of symbolic resources drawn on by CT believers about important dimensions of ontology, epistemology, and human agency. The worldview is structured around six main dimensions: the nature of reality, the self, the outgroup, the ingroup, relevant social and political action, and possible future change. We also describe an ascending typology of five types of CT believers, which vary according to their positions on each of these dimensions. Our findings converge with prior explorations of CT beliefs but also revealed novel aspects: A sense of community among CT believers, a highly differentiated representation of the outgroup, a personal journey of conversion, variegated kinds of political action, and optimistic belief in future change. These findings are at odds with the typical image of monological CT believers as paranoid, cynical, anomic and irrational. For many, the CT worldview may rather constitute the ideological underpinning of a nascent pre-figurative social movement.
In dem Artikel dann weiter (um Auflistung ergänzt zur besseren Übersichtlichkeit):
The worldview is structured around six main dimensions:
- the nature of reality,
- the self,
- the outgroup,
- the ingroup,
- relevant social and political action, and
- possible future change.
We also describe an ascending typology of five types of CT believers, which vary according to their positions on each of these dimensions. Our findings converge with prior explorations of CT beliefs but also revealed novel aspects:
- A sense of community among CT believers,
- a highly differentiated representation of the outgroup,
- a personal journey of conversion,
- variegated kinds of political action, and optimistic belief in future change.
These findings are at odds with the typical image of monological CT believers as paranoid, cynical, anomic and irrational. For many, the CT worldview may rather constitute the ideological underpinning of a nascent pre-figurative social movement.
Dann erfolgt eine interessante Einordnung in Typen:
Type 1: Something Is Not in Order
One participant (R6) expressed this dissatisfaction with the status quo and mainstream problem solutions, a sense that the world is out of joint, and a desire to proffer solutions within commonsense ontology and conventional values. R6 explicitly disavows the relevance of CTs, not considering their potential truth or falsity: “I don’t mean to make that sound like there’s a conspiracy such as the Illuminati conspiracy. I am not, I don’t delve into that. Just, is there an over-influence? I don’t mean, I don’t believe that our politicians are evil people.” R6 saw themself as an “issue entrepreneur,” offering a website and criteria for developing societal solutions like “regulated capitalism” with a “greater happiness index.” So Type 1’s unease is an entirely conventional questioning of political orthodoxies, which does not see the relevance or potential truth of CTs. No particularly high degree of epistemic uncertainty attaches to this position.
Type 2: There Is More to Reality Than Meets the Eye
Two participants (R4 and R15) expressed this dissatisfaction with the status quo and a sense that there is really more at play in the world than appears to be the case to ordinary observers. This is broadly skeptical, aiming not to make “false negative” assumptions about reality, suspending (dis)belief pending further evidence. By contrast with Type 1, Type 2 sees CTs as relevant and possibly believable: R15 says (re 9/11): “In my opinion, the mainstream story is a load of crap but at the same time, I can’t say with any certainty what really happened. I just don’t think it is as it appears … I can’t say what has happened but I don’t believe with certainty.” And R4 suggests that the decision about whether to follow CTs is an active one: “We have the choice of what we will buy into,” and chooses not to do so because “belief in this is pretty damned sinister,” and leads “people [to] give their energy to negativity.” This uses commonsense ontology and expresses uncertainty about official explanations. R15 says, “I really hate it when people shoot down … ‘CTs’ and I’m like, ‘why, why, why did you shoot this down? Because BBC News told you that Al Qaeda flew a plane into a building.’ That to me is the definition of narrow-mindedness. I mean I don’t know what happened, I have no idea what happened … I can’t say with any certainty this did happen and this didn’t happen.” R15 explicitly juxtaposes a potentially believable specific CT with unbelievable general CTs: “Like 9/11, I think it is perfectly reasonable and not crazy to say that one is suspicious of the mainstream story and that’s fine most people can get on board with that. The minute you put David Icke into the mix with his Reptilian nonsense, you are then devaluing a whole field.” R4 also expressed open-mindedness about CT and non-CT explanations: “that middle zone of ‘I believe it and I don’t believe it.’ I don’t have to come down to one side or the other.” Type 2’s unease thus runs deeper than Type 1, accepting the relevance and the possible truth of specific CTs.
Type 3: Some Official Narratives Are Not True
One participant (R10) expressed this view, advancing a CT to address one specific issue, but disavowing generalized CTs. This CT used commonsense ontology and assumptions to explain the behavior of specific conspiratorial agents. R10 suggested that “chemtrails” produced by aeroplanes have not been satisfactorily explained; following investigation, R10 suggests it may connect to weather manipulation, but believes there is a cover-up. For R10 this CT belief has no monological extrapolation: for example, of the Illuminati, and New World Order, they say: “I don’t know. I’m not too familiar with that. I don’t really know what I believe about that.” However, the general uncertainty is not ameliorated – other conspiracies could be possible, though there is no clear evidence either way. For R10 this is because of a lack of accurate information: “If you are going to have a society where a lot of truth isn’t told and if there are outlets for truth-tellers why would you allow that? It would be so easy to create a misinformation site to discredit that,” created by “people who are currently in control of society.” This lack of trust in authority and its explanations does not generate monologicality: CTs apply to specific cases but are not the default frame of reference In Type 3, but even more in Type 4, participants indicate increasing concern with the deceptive nature of official narratives (Sutton and Douglas, 2014).
Type 4: All Official Narratives Are Illusions: The Mainstream versus Reality
Several participants (R2, R8, R11, R12, R13, R14, and R16) expressed this monological conspiratorial worldview as a default frame of reference. This uses commonsense ontology of conspiring agents with, as the quasi-religious account of CTs (Franks et al., 2013) suggests, a minimally counter-intuitive understanding of their actions and agency; ordinary people and groups able to control things which are usually seen as outside human control, e.g., financial markets, climate change and variation. Supernormal agency in specific areas is ascribed to normal actors. Analogous religious representations (e.g., Sperber, 1996; Boyer, 2001) involve uncertainty because their implications are not fully processed – for example, in the Roman Catholic Mass the wine is simultaneously wine and the blood of Christ (Franks, 2003). The uncertain but potentially malign qualities of authority agents supports a mistrust of authority. For example, R2 aims to develop a “unifying theory of political economy,” to explain financial crises and governments’ complicitness in them, and explain 9/11, where “what can’t be true is an official story”; this lack of trust extends to official ‘false flags’ regarding other CTs by R2 (e.g., the murder of JFK on November 22, 1963, or the Charlie Hebdo attacks of January 7, 2015). R11 mirrors this pattern: one CT – the legal issues surrounding the United Kingdom’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2002 – is used as the paradigm case for generalizing to others (e.g., 9/11/2001, 7/7/2005), so that ultimately, “we can no longer trust our government.” Hence, a monological lack of trust in official sources generates widespread CTs.
Type 5: All of Reality Is an Illusion: The Ontological-Symbolic Turn
Several participants (R1.1, R1.2, R1.3, R1, R3, R5, R7, R9, R17, and R18) expressed this fully fledged conspiratorial worldview. However, unlike Type 4, at least some of the key agents hypothesized go beyond commonsense ontologies to supernatural explanations incorporating non-human agents or human agents with non-human lineages. R1, following David Icke, speaks of alien reptilian entities which “feed on fear and lower energies which is why there is again a certain control because they are manipulating the planet.” R5 refers to contacts with UFOs, and a controlling human “cabal” originating in non-human aliens. R7 also refers to controlling aliens, but does not suggest these are reptilian nor any human contact with them. Such entities are able to demonstrate control via capacities that go beyond the human – an ontology of supernatural entities possessing supernatural agency. Whereas for Type 4 there appears an essential connection between the espoused CTs and their monological generalization, for Type 5 there is no such connection; instead, what guarantees monologicality is the appeal to an ontology populated with supernatural agency which permeates all important areas of life. Here we hear of the lizards and shapeshifters who control things behind the scenes. The distrust of authority may be a consequence rather than a cause of monologicality. The all-embracing explanation renders the CTs immune from doubt. Nor do they answer to publicly available empirical data in the way that Type 4 at least has the scope to do. As R1 comments, “It doesn’t matter if you think, ‘oh this guy that everybody is talking about is absolutely nuts,’ because it is part of my journey of understanding my existence.”
Für mich hat der moderne Feminismus viel von einer Sekte, einer Religon oder einer Verschwörungstheorie. das war auch schon Gegenstand einiger Artikel:
Sie sind vielleicht nicht auf der Stufe von den Echsenmenschen, aber das allumfassende Patriarchat und die Rape Culture, das geheimen Netzwerk der alten weißen Männer und Thesen wie die Zwangsheterosexualisierung der Frauen etc sind ja auch nicht schlecht. Der Poststrukturalismus eignet sich auch perfekt dazu, alle Realität zu leugnen und dahinter nur Macht zu sehen, die geheime Strukturen erzeugt, die Frauen kleinhalten. Es wäre auch interessant für die Einstufung der „Mitläufer“ auf geringeren Stufen („ich glaube zwar nicht an ein Patriarchat, aber Frauen verdienen nun einmal weniger“).
Was auch gut passt ist die Gruppe der „Sheep“. Das wären dann die Frauen mit ihrer internalisierten Frauenfeindlichkeit und die Männer, die sich ihrer Privilegien und der Art und Weise wie ihnen das Patriarchat schadet nicht bewußt sind.
Die Ebenen darüber wäre dann die „hegemoniale Männlichkeit“ und die weißen alten Männer die „Elite Evils“.
Die „InGroup“ der „heldenhaften Personen“ und der „Wahrheitssucher“, die versucht die anderen zum „Erwachen“ zu bringen („Woke“ ist ja der Ausdruck im amerikanischen für die, die erkannt haben, wie unterdrückt die Welt ist)
Natürlich ist das nicht auf den Feminismus beschränkt. Auch die Männerbewegung oder die Vaterrechtsbewegung haben teilweise ähnliche Strukturen. Insbesondere die „Große Gerichtsverschwörung„, nach der alle Familienrichter entweder Feministen sind, vorsätzlich die Gesetze falsch anwenden, am Kinderhandel verdienen oder einen nur fertig machen wollen geht in diese Richtung. Auch der Bereich „Game“ hat über „Red Pill“ ein Konzept, auf dem sich leicht eine sehr krude Weltsicht zB der Überlegenheit des Mannes und des Wunsches der Frau nach Unterwerfung aufbauen lässt.
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