„Warum mögen Frauen Frauen lieber als Männer Männer?“

Eine Interessante Studie beschäftigt sich mit dem „in-Group-Bias“, also der Vorliebe für die eigene Gruppe im Bereich der Geschlechter:

Four experiments confirmed that women’s automatic in-group bias is remarkably stronger than men’s and investigated explanations for this sex difference, derived from potential sources of implicit attitudes (L. A. Rudman, 2004). In Experiment 1, only women (not men) showed cognitive balance among in-group bias, identity, and self-esteem (A. G. Greenwald et al., 2002), revealing that men lack a mechanism that bolsters automatic own group preference. Experiments 2 and 3 found pro-female bias to the extent that participants automatically favored their mothers over their fathers or associated male gender with violence, suggesting that maternal bonding and male intimidation influence gender attitudes. Experiment 4 showed that for sexually experienced men, the more positive their attitude was toward sex, the more they implicitly favored women. In concert, the findings help to explain sex differences in automatic in-group bias and underscore the uniqueness of gender for intergroup relations theorists.

Quelle: Gender differences in automatic in-group bias: why do women like women more than men like men?

Aus einer Besprechung der Studie:

Women are nearly five times more likely to show an automatic preference for their own gender than men are to show such favoritism for their own gender

Fünfmal wahrscheinlicher, dass Frauen Präferenzen für ihr eigenes Geschlecht zeigen, dass ist schon ein sehr großer Unterschied:

Moreover, men and women tended to show high implicit self-esteem and high gender identity; however, men showed low pro-male gender attitudes, according to the study. „A clear pattern shown in all four studies is that men do not like themselves automatically as much as women like themselves,“ Rudman says. „This contradicts a lot of theoretical thinking about implicit attitudes regarding status differences.“ More specifically, men are historically and cross-culturally viewed as the dominant sex, so it might logically follow that they’d have a greater in-group bias, Rudman says. To explore why their study found the opposite pattern, Rudman and Goodwin evaluated several possible reasons. They found:

  • Women’s high self-esteem and female identity, on average, bolstered their automatic liking for women, whereas men’s liking for men did not rely on high self-esteem or masculine identity. In other words, women can be characterized as thinking „if I am good and I am female, females are good,“ whereas men can be characterized as thinking „even if I am good and I am male, men are not necessarily good.“
  • Men and women who implicitly favored their mothers over their fathers–such as by associating more positive words with their mothers than their fathers–also showed a pro-female bias, which suggests the influence of maternal bonding on gender preferences. In addition, people who reported being raised primarily by their mothers also showed pro-female bias on the IAT. Researchers, using self-reports, found no evidence that maternal attitudes influenced gender attitudes. In concert, these results are consistent with the theory that developmental events can influence implicit attitudes more than explicit attitudes, Rudman says.
  • Men and women who automatically perceived men as more threatening or intimidating than women also had pro-female preferences, suggesting that negative male stereotypes can promote greater liking for women.
  • Implicitly, men who reported liking sex also preferred women, but only if they were high on sexual experience. Men low on sexual experience showed implicit sexism to the extent they liked sex.
  • „These results suggest that for men, pro-female bias is moderated by sexual gratification,“ Rudman says. „By contrast, women who implicitly liked sex also preferred men, whether or not they were high on sexual experience.“

Frauen würden demnach zum einen eher von sich selbst auf andere Frauen schließen (und vielleicht auch andersrum, also: Wenn ich eine Frau bin, dann müssen Frauen gut sein, weil ich mich gut fühlen möchte“). Männer differenzieren anscheinend eher zwischen sich und der Gruppe Männer.

Zudem scheint die starke Position der Mutter hier ebenfalls durchzuschlagen und positive Assoziationen zu wecken. Männer werden hingehen mitunter eher als angsteinflössend wahrgenommen. Und erfolgreiche Männer mögen auch Frauen, weniger erfolgreiche nicht so unbedingt, wenn sie Sex wollen.

Interessanterweise passt dabei einiges auch auf den Feminismus: In diesem wird der Gynozentrismus und das Ingrouping stark gefördert und der Schluß auf „Frau=gut“ noch stärker genutzt und auf „weiblichkeit=gut“ erweitert. Es wird zudem vieles dafür gemacht, Männer als angsteinflössend und bedrohlich darzustellen („Rape Culture“) und auch der hohe Anteil feindlicher Lesben innerhalb des Feminismus würde gut zum letzten Punkt passen.

Ein interessanter Name dafür scheint auch der „Women are wonderful-Effekt“ zu sein:

The “women are wonderful” effect is the phenomenon found in psychological research which suggests that people associate more positive attributes with the general social category of women compared to men. Related to ambivalent sexism, this effect reflects an emotional bias toward the female gender as a general case. The phrase was coined by Eagly & Mladinic (1994) after finding that both male and female participants tend to assign exceptionally positive traits to the female gender (males are also viewed positively, though not quite as positively), with female participants showing a far more pronounced bias. The authors supposed that the positive general evaluation of women might derive from the association between women and nurturing characteristics.

Eine andere interessante Bezeichnung wäre Gynosympathy:

Gynosympathy is the well-documented, yet poorly examined, tendency in human being to sympathize with females more than males, leading to the preferential protection and appeasement of women. As a scientific reality, gynosympathy is so well demonstrated that it is virtually irrefutable.1 As a social concept, however, it is virtually unknown.

The reasons for this discrepancy are many, not least of which is that gynosympathy is such a deeply rooted phenomenon that human beings have a very difficult time recognizing it.

It likely has both evolutionary and cultural aspects. For example, Bateman’s Principle would lead us to suspect that men would exhibit gynosympathy more often in the context of sexual relations (or their implied or imagined potential)

Dass dies sehr gut evolutionär entstanden sein könnte und eben darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass Frauen als Gruppe eher zusammenhalten mussten und Männer aufgrund der Kosten des Sex sich eher um Frauen bemühen mussten, kann ich mir gut vorstellen.

In dem Artikel finden sich noch andere interessante Gedanken:

Of course, researchers often focus on conclusions other than gynosympathy; the authors of the PWQ study, for example, lamented that women were not allowed to be angry. Ironically, by sympathizing preferentially with women (why not lament that men were not allowed to be sad?) the researchers were exhibiting the very bias they thought they were addressing.

A human gynosympathetic bias is clear. It absolutely saturates gender politics, leading to exaggerations of the plight of women like the “rule of thumb” myth, the “wage gap” myth, and the widespread belief that before the 20th century no woman could own property. It leads political activists to glamorize the history of voting rights and ignore conscription, to demonize men for fighting (and dying) in war while glossing over the well-documented role of women in urging, and even shaming, men to trek off to battle while they remained home in peace and safety.

Gynosympathy distorts legislation, leading to brazenly discriminatory laws that explicitly name women as a class of victims who need special protection, even against problems (like violence) where men suffer comparable or even higher rates of victimhood. It skews medical research, leading to preferential funding for women’s health issues out of proportion to their incidence and fatality rates compared to similar men’s health issues. And, in US courts, the influence of gynosympathy drives a sexist bias in prosecution, sentencing, and execution that dwarfs the racial biases in the justice system.

It is time to recognize this cognitive bias for the systemic and dangerously discriminatory influence that it is; to seek out its discriminatory influence in ourselves, our culture, and our institutions; and to push for a more rational, scientific, ethical, equitable, humane, and universally sympathetic approach to gender issues.

Wenn man darauf abstellt, dass Frauenbevorzugung oder eine besseres Denken über Frauen ein kognitives Vorurteil ist, dann kann man sich dementsprechend auch damit befassen, sich durch dieses die Sicht nicht verstellen zu lassen. Dann aber muss man auch Überprüfungen daraufhin vornehmen, ob sich dieses Vorurteil in gesellschaftlichen Regelungen niedergeschlagen hat und ob dies gerecht ist.